DECIDED: 1, 2003 august
Summary judgment. Fulton Superior Court. Before Judge Longer.
Troutman Sanders, William M. Droze, David M. Green, for appellants.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Isaac Byrd, Senior Assistant Attorneys General, Samantha M. Rein, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
United States Of America payday advances Advance Centers, American advance loan, Inc., EZ Credit, Inc., Fast money `Til Payday, Inc., Great American advance loan, Inc., Great American Credit, Inc., Monday `Til Payday, Inc., United States Of America pay day loan, Inc., United States Of America payday advances Advance Center #8, https://installmentloansonline.org Inc., United States Of America payday advances Advance Center #9, Inc., USA cash advance Center #10, Inc., United States Of America cash advance Center #11, Inc., United States Of America cash advance Center #12, Inc., United States Of America cash advance Center #13, Inc., and United States Of America cash advance Center #14, Inc. Brought a judgment that is declaratory against John W. Oxedine, indiv motion for summary judgment had been issued because of the test court for Oxendine. Finding no mistake, we affirm.
In July of 2002, the Commissioner authorized a study of the “payday loan” activities of USA Payday Advance Centers. An administrative “show cause” order issued, and the plaintiffs were among the parties named in the order as a result of the examination. Following the hearing on October 11, 2002, the Commissioner unearthed that the plaintiffs were in violation regarding the Industrial Loan Act in creating loans without an commercial loan license as well as in making false and deceptive advertisments of loans; the Commissioner commanded them to cease and desist from making loans “except as permitted underneath the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. ” Plaintiffs had been asking a yearly rate of interest of 650%. On October 22, 2002, the superior court denied plaintiffs’ benefit of your order. On December 2, 2002, plaintiffs dismissed that appeal.
On December 3, 2003, plaintiffs filed this declaratory judgment action and alleged which they no further made the loans but that, as “companies” for County Bank, the loans had been now produced by County Bank through them. November 13, 2002, ended up being the effective date for such start up business procedure to start. Plaintiffs stated an exemption through the Georgia Industrial Loan behave as agents for the out-of-state bank. Nonetheless, such provider contract, that has been alleged within the verified pleadings, ended up being never put in proof.
During the time that the declaratory judgment action was brought, the Commissioner hadn’t determined whether or otherwise not to open up a study into plaintiffs’ home based business arrangement with County Bank, since the Commissioner had no details about this new arrangement and loans together with taken no place in regards to the procedure that is new.
The Commissioner relocated for summary judgment on the grounds that no “actual or controversy that is justiciable existed with regard to plaintiffs’ brand new arrangement with County Bank and that there was in fact no ruling desired on plaintiffs’ brand brand brand new arrangement because of the Commissioner pursuant to his laws allowing needs for declaratory rulings. Consequently, plaintiffs neglected to exhaust its administrative remedies ahead of searching for action that is judicial.
Under OCGA § 7-3-1 et seq., the Georgia Industrial Loan Act, loans under $3,000 or less come in the ambit associated with the Act. “a loan that is payday that loan of brief length, typically fourteen days, at an astronomical yearly interest rate. ” Smith v. Steinkamp, 318 F. 3d 775, 776-777 (7th Cir. 2003). Pay day loans are the existing form of “salary buying” or “wage buying. ” See Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Assoc., 191 Ga. 366, 381(3) ( 12 S.E. 2d 602) (1940); Hinton v. Mack Publishing Co., 41 Ga. App. 823, 826 ( 155 S.E. 78) (1930). The costs, fees, and interest on a quick payday loan are between 15% and 30% for the principal for a loan that is two-week constituting a pretext for usury. Cashback Catalog deals, Inc. V. Cost, 102 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000); see also Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594 ( 499 S.E. 2d 266) (1998); White v. Check always Holders, Inc., 996 S.W. 2d 496 (Ky. 1999). Because the Georgia Industrial Loan Act had been enacted to “define and avoid usury” and also to give a supply of regulated funds “for folks who have been borrowing at usurious prices from loan sharks, road shylocks and wagebuyers, ” then such transactions that are financial in the jurisdiction for the Act. Consequently, the Industrial Loan Commissioner has jurisdiction over “wage-buyers. ” OCGA § 7-37-1 et seq.; 1954-56 Op. Att’y Gen. At pp. 385-386. In the event that maximum rate of interest is finished the limitation set by OCGA § 7-3-14 of 10per cent or perhaps the loan provider does not hold a commercial permit released because of the Commissioner, then “payday loans” violate the Georgia Industrial Loan Act. See 2002, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 2002-3.
Freeman v. Decatur Loan Finance Corp., 140 Ga. App. 682, 685 ( 231 S.E. 2d 409) (1976).
So that they can circumvent state usury rules, some payday loan providers have actually contracted with federally chartered banking institutions or state chartered banks insured by the FDIC to benefit from federal banking guidelines that enable such banking institutions to help make loans across state lines without respect to that state’s interest and usury legislation in “rent-a-charter” or “rent-a-bank” contracts. See State of Colorado ex rel. Salazar v. ACE Cash Express, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1285-1286 (D. Colo. 2002); very Long v. ACE money Exp., 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 24617 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Goleta Nat’l Bank v. Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D.N.C. 2002). Whether it has took place this situation and whether it’s genuine or a subterfuge that is mere to circumvent Georgia usury legislation may not be reached in this situation, as the plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative treatments and also to place the contract with County Bank into proof.
The judicial branch lacks jurisdiction to deal with an executive branch function until there has been an exhaustion of administrative remedies, i.e., the executive branch has no further remedy under the separation of powers under the Georgia Constitution. The precise empowerment that is legislative judicial writeup on executive action is strictly followed. Perkins v. Dep. Of medical attention, 252 Ga. App. 35, 36-38(1) ( 555 S.E. 2d 500) (2001). The explanation is the fact that “resort to your administrative procedure will let the agency to utilize its expertise, protect the agency’s autonomy, enable a far more efficient quality, and bring about the consistent application of things in the agency’s jurisdiction. ” Cerulean Co., Inc. V. Tiller, 271 Ga. 65, 67(1) ( 516 S.E. 2d 522) (1999). A plaintiff “is forbidden from doing by indirection that which it really is forbidden from doing straight, i.e., bypassing the fatigue of administrative appeals. ” (Citations omitted. ) Perkins v. Dept. Of medical attention, supra at 38.
Long-standing Georgia legislation calls for that an event aggrieved by a situation agency’s choice must raise all problems before that agency and exhaust available administrative remedies before looking for any review that is judicial of agency’s choice. Provided that there is certainly a successful and available remedy that is administrative a celebration is needed to pursue that treatment before looking for equitable relief in superior court.
Cerulean Co., Inc. V. Tiller, supra at p. 66. Subsequently,
An action for declaratory judgment will never be amused where in fact the liberties of this events have previously accrued in addition to plaintiff faces no chance of using future undirected action. In which a statute provides a celebration with a way of review by an agency that is administrative such procedure is usually a sufficient remedy at legislation to be able to preclude the grant of equitable relief.